The Metropolis, Home Rule, and the Special District by Brooks, Wayne A.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1959
The Metropolis, Home Rule, and the Special
District
Wayne A. Brooks
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Wayne A. Brooks, The Metropolis, Home Rule, and the Special District, 11 Hastings L.J. 110 (1959).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol11/iss2/2
THE METROPOLIS, HOME RULE, AND THE
SPECIAL DISTRICT
A Discussion of the Legal Validity of the Special District
Used in the Solution of Metropolitan Problems in California
PART ONE*
By WAYNE A. BROOKSt
"People, people everywhere, and the smog begins to stink!" This rude
paraphrase of Coleridge's famous line is real to the people of California,
and air pollution is only one of the many (though perhaps the more dra-
matic) physical problems which result from the population explosion that
California is experiencing. Unfortunately, the difficulties that arise in solv-
ing these physical problems frequently are compounded by the fragmenta-
tion of local government. Smog recognizes no governmental boundaries,
nor does water pollution, nor urban blight, nor crime. Yet the man-made
boundary lines of local governments are as real in the eyes of the law as a
chain of mountains in the eyes of the human beholder. The result-the met-
ropolis' and the metropolitan problems. It is with one type of governmental
solution to metropolitan problems that the present discussion is concerned.
Home Rule
Before examining the characteristics of a metropolitan area, brief con-
sideration should be given to "Home Rule" and to the division of govern-
ment between the traditional units of local government--cities and
* Ed. note: Part two of this article will appear in Volume 11, Number 3 (February, 1960).
t B.A., St. Ambrose College; J.D., College of Law, State University of Iowa; LLM., School
of Law, Stanford University. Member, Iowa and California Bars. Assistant Professor of Busi-
ness Law, Fresno State College.
This article was prepared under the direction of Professor Gordon Scott of Stanford Uni-
versity, School of Law, without whose criticism, advice, and encouragement the task could not
have been completed.
I A metropolis or metropolitan area may be defined as a central city surrounded by popu-
lated areas, incorporated or unincorporated, which do not come under the governmental control
of the central city, but which with the central city form a "social, economic, and sometimes
physical unit." Studenski, Government of Metropolitan Areas, National Municipal League
(1930), p. 7. The U.S. Bureau of the Census defines a "standard metropolitan area" as
... a county or group of contiguous counties (except in New England) which contains
at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants.... In addition to the county or counties, con-
taining such a city, or cities, contiguous counties are included.., if according to certain
criteria they are essentially metropolitan in character and sufficiently integrated with
the central city.
Statistical Abstract o1 the United States, 1955, p. 18. California possesses eight such areas, two
of which are San Francisco-Oakland and San Jose. Statistical supra, at 18-19.
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counties.2 The desire for independence and freedom in local govern-
ment gives rise to "Home Rule" sentiments within the local area.
"Home Rule" as used here means the right of the populace of a local
area to create (within limits laid down by the state constitution and/or state
statutes) their own local governments, define its powers, describe the boun-
daries within which it is to exist, and prevent interference by the state gov-
ernment with what they have created. This right has been embodied in the
constitution of California,3 and, in this state, the problems thus posed are
constitutional and not statutory. Apparently these provisions were designed
as protection against the state legislature,4 but more recently they have
been used to preserve local identity against an enroaching city or prevent
a change in local zoning by a county.5
While cities may turn over to the county certain of their municipal
functions when the county is authorized to perform such functions,6
the fact remains that these units are independent in the view of the
law. As to functions not surrendered by the city and as to matters in-
volving regulation within the city, the county cannot operate within the
limits of the city.' By the same token the city is generally unable to regulate
conduct beyond its boundaries.8 When various independent special districts
2 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 1 recognizes the counties as legal subdivisions of the state. It has
been held that counties are not municipal corporations though they are public corporations,
People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489, 22 Pac. 851 (1889), and more recently that they are not
corporations at all, but possible quasi corporations, Estate of Miller, 5 Cal. 2d 588, 55 P.2d 491
(1936).
3 CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 11, 12, 13. These sections were part of the constitution as adopted
in 1879 and, while amended in certain particulars, remain substantially the same. A provision
restricting the legislature in specific instances and generally in passing local and special laws
is article VI, § 25.
4 At one point in the Constitutional Convention discussion of § 6 of article XI it was sug-
gested that the clause prohibiting special creation of "corporations for municipal purposes" was
unnecessary because the subsequent provision requiring a general incorporation law for cities
was sufficient. Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Cali-
fornia, Vol. II, p. 1050 (1878). However, the clause appears in the final draft as adopted. De-
bates; supra Vol. III, p. 516.
5 .E.g., the formation of Fremont in Alameda County (encroaching city); Los Altos Hills
in Santa Clara County (change in county zoning). Palo Alto Times, Apr. 2, 1956, p. 18.
6 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6, last sentence; art. XI, § 72 (4Y2) (last part).
7 According to one writer the cases are in confusion on this point, but he suggests the better
view is that the county should not be permitted to regulate within cities. Peppin, Municipal
Home Rule in California, 32 CArxw. L. REv. 341, 376-379 (1944). An examination of the cases
cited by Mr. Peppin supports his conclusion, but in 1953 a district court of appeal held that A
county zoning ordinance could not continue to be operative for land annexed to a city even
though the city had no zoning ordinance for the land. City of South San Francisco v. Berry,
120 Cal. App. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 1045 (1953). This case suggests that the restrictive view of
county power, which is in line with the more recent cases discussed by Mr. Peppin, is to prevail.
8 City of Oakland v. Brock, 8 Cal. 2d 639, 67 P.2d 344 (1937). The court noted that there
are exceptions but held that inspection of slaughter houses in adjacent cities is not within the
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performing nominally "city" functions for urbanized but unincorporated
areas are added to the structure, confusion is compounded?
The Metropolitan Area
This brings us to the metropolitan area for it is the fragmentation of
local government due to theories of independence and the desire for "Home
Rule" that causes the development of a metropolis. If the central city could
easily expand its boundaries as required by population growth on its
fringes, or if the county could carry on all the functions of city government
without regard to the boundary lines of cities (or of other counties), there
would be no metropolitan area. The physical conditions which give rise to
demands for governmental solution would be within the competence of a
government which could proceed to deal with them."° On this basis metro-
politan problems are caused by the relationships between local governments
and are only incidentally related to the problem of state-local relationships.
The state-local relationship becomes involved when there is an appeal to the
state to coerce a recalcitrant city which is causing difficulty to its neighbors
or when some new grant of authority is thought to be needed to create a
new local-local arrangement. Since the physical problem may be character-
ized as local-applying only to the metropolitan area-and difficult in solu-
tion primarily because of the relationship of city to city, city to county, and
county to county, any act by the state in providing machinery for solution
raises the questions of state interference with "Home Rule."
The Special District
The special district, as that term is used here, contemplates a form of
governmental organization which is independent of other governments; it
is a body, responsible directly to the people, or to member cities, counties,
or possibly even states, with power to initiate and complete projects, pro-
vide for financing, and otherwise behave as much like a government as is
necessary to accomplish its purposes. When a problem arises which is
viewed as a local rather than a state matter, yet which is metropolitan in
scope, the use of the special district to provide machinery for solution has
exceptions. See also Peppin, supra note 7, at 348 n.17 which indicates that the exceptional situ-
ation results when the external regulation is incidental to granting a permit to engage in an
activity within the city.
9 The Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning Special Districts of California
for 1952-53 prepared by the State Controller lists 64 different authorizations for districts
covering 37 service groupings. At that time there were 1322 such districts in the state. Annual
Report, supra pp. vi, vii, and xi.
10 For a delineation and discussion of some of these physical problems which have become
metropolitan in scope see Bollens, The Problem of Government in the San Francisco Bay Region,
Bureau of Public Administration University of California Berkeley (1948). Various govern-
mental solutions are also discussed.
[Vol. 11
strong appeal: It is familiar; it has been used successfully to solve similar
problems (or at least it appears to have been successful); it does not appear
to be a politically violent method of achieving area control for it does not
appear to involve the giving up of more than one function by the cities and
counties; and it does not mean that one city is taking over another, nor is
the county interfering with a city or another county." As a matter of prac-
tical politics all these arguments can be made, but it is the thesis of this dis-
cussion that the use of the special district to solve metropolitan government
problems involves serious questions about the survival of the concept of
"Home Rule." Perhaps the concept is no longer of value, but its destruc-
tion, if that is to be, ought to come as a part of a redetermination of the
framework of local government rather than by a process of expediency.
Methods of Formation of Special Districts
There are three basic methods for the formation of special districts:
1) By direct action of the state legislature;'
2) Under a statute authorizing the formation of such districts:
a) By election following notice of hearing, hearing before, and ap-
proval by a local administrative or legislative body (ordinarily
the county Board of Supervisors).1
b) By election without hearing after approval by a local administra-
tive or legislative body.'4
The restrictions on the use of any of these methods contained in the
United States Constitution are very slight. Apparently the only due process
requirement imposed by the fourteenth amendment is that there be a hear-
ing on the matter of taxation if the method of taxation used is to assess the
cost of the project against the land benefitted according to the benefits. 5
There is a presumption of hearing in the first method,16 and one is specifi-
cally provided for in the second. A district formed by the third method
would appear bad if the tax were the special assessment, benefit-burden
IlBolens, supra note 10, at 27. For a discussion of the political problems involved in
integrating local government in a metropolitan area, see, Bollens, supra note 10, at 54-94.
12 This is the method used in creating the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, CAL.
HALnTH & SAimTy CoDE § 24350.
13 This method is specified for seven types of districts by CAL. Gov. CODE § 58308 under the
District Organization Law. The procedure is set forth in CAL. Gov. CODE § 58090-58100. The
District Investigation Law also specifies hearing for 21 types of districts, CAL. Gov. CoDE
§ 58501-58621.
14 This was the method used in the formation of the irrigation district approved in In re
Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272 (1891).
15 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896) in which a California irri-
gation district was upheld. The court held that there was a hearing as to the apportionment of
the tax and that it was not necessary to hold a hearing as to creation.
16 People v. Sacramento Drainage District, 155 Cal. 373, 103 Pac. 207 (1909) ; Santa Bar-
bara, Etc., Agency v. All Persons, 47 CaL 2d 699, 306 P.2d 875 (1957).
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type. However, if the district does not tax on a benefit-burden basis, but on
a general revenue basis for general district purposes, i.e. in a manner similar
to a city, there need be no hearing.17 Thus the hearing requirement is re-
lated solely to the tax-that which takes property-and is not concerned
with the form of organization, the powers granted, or the duties to be per-
formed except insofar as these matters affect the tax levy. As far as the
federal constitution is concerned, the state has full power to create what-
ever local governments it wishes, provided only that hearing be granted to
affected property owners when the tax assessment purports to relate burden
to benefit.' 8
While the federal constitution appears unconcerned with matters of
method of creation, powers granted, and duties given, the California Con-
stitution is somewhat more specific. It is with these constitutional limita-
tions on the power of the legislature that the special district, when used to
provide government for a metropolitan area, may conflict. A prime example
of the use of the special district in this manner is found in the San Francisco
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District which was created in 1955 by act
of the California Legislature 9 and will be used here as a basis for discussion
of the issues raised by such an attempt at imposition of a new governmental
unit on top of the existing cities and counties. The District presents some
very interesting questions because it has been given regulatory power, it
spans both cities and counties, and was created by special law. This appears
to be the first attempt to combine all these features in one district.'
17 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Henshaw v. Foster, 176
Cal. 507, 169 Pac. 82 (1917) (upholding lack of hearing on ground that district was public
corporation with political duties) ; Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 189 Cal. 254,
208 Pac. 304 (1922) (holding that hearing was required because taxation was to assess benefits
of the district on private lands, not to tax for municipal purposes). Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Board
of Supervisors, supra at 267, 208 Pac. at 310, the court in commenting on these cases stated:
The only E ?I difficulty in applying the decisions on this subject is to determine whether
or not the district created by the subordinate body in pursuance of an act of the legis-
lature is in the nature of a public corporation, the inhabitants of which are subject to
taxation without any hearing as to the benefits to be derived from the creation and con-
duct of such a corporation, or is an assessment district created for the primary purpose
of assessing upon private lands the benefits to be derived thereby from the public im-
provements for the purpose the district is formed.
18 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, supra note 25, at 174. The court, after noting
that the district had been characterized as a public corporation by the California court, stated:
There is nothing in the essential nature of such a corporation, so far as its creation only
is concerned, which requires notice to or hearing of the parties included therein before
it can be formed. It is created for a public purpose, and it rests in the discretion of the
legislature when to create it, and with what powers to endow it.
19 CAL. HEALTH & SAFEITY CODE § 24345 et seq.
2 0 Districts to provide flood control, drainage, levees, and irrigation have been created by
special law. See, e.g., Peppin, Municipal Home Ride in California, 34 CALrF. L. Rav. 644, 668
n.94; People Levee District No. 6, 131 Cal. 30, 63 Pac. 676 (1900) ; People Sacramento Drainage
District, supra note 26. These districts were created to provide specific services and not to
regulate conduct.
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The Physical Problem (Air Pollution)
Giving Rise to a Metropolitan Special District
The need for control of air pollution in the Bay Area-the existence of
a physical problem-is well documented.21 While the conditions had not
reached the degree experienced in the Los Angeles area, there was sufficient
pollution that some remedial step seemed imperative to the people in the
Bay Area.' While cities and counties had the power to deal with the prob-
lem within their respective spheres,' the limited nature of their power made
effective control impossible. Since 1947 a law had existed permitting coun-
ties to form air pollution control districts for the county.' Insofar as the
problem is localized within the county, such a district should be able to deal
with it (saving whatever might be said about interference within the cities
by a county-wide agency). However, the problem in the Bay Area is not so
conveniently isolated and multi-county organization was necessary. To
provide this the 1947 statute authorized adjoining counties having air pollu-
tion control districts to unite these districts.' 5 The big hitch was the re-
quirement that the county districts exist before unification was possible.'m
In 1948 one county (Santa Clara) of the nine Bay Area counties formed a
district. Up to the passage of the act creating the Bay Area District, no
other county had done so, though Alameda County was considering the
step.- Since permissive joinder was not working and the physical problem
was growing, compulsory joinder seemed imperative to the Assembly Com-
mittee investigating the matter. It therefore recommended the passage of
the act and the Bay Area District came into being in October 1955 for six
of the nine counties with option to the remaining three to join later.26
21 Air Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area, Report of the Joint Subcommittee on Air
Pollution of the Assembly Interim Committees on Conservation, Planning and Public Works,
Feb., 1955.
2 2 Id. at 24-41.
23 Kennedy, The Legal Aspects of Air Pollution Control, Municipalities and the Law in
Action, 1947 Ed. 424.24 CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24198 et seq. The validity of the standard used for test-
ing pollution density was tested in the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court in
People v. Plywood Mfgrs. of California, 137 Cal. App. 2d 859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955). None of
the California Constitutional issues were raised.
2 5 CAL. HEATHm & SAFETY CODn §§ 24330-24341.
261d. § 24330.
27 Air Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area, supra note 31.
28 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24350.2 specifies that the district shall commence business
in Alameda, Contra Costa, Matin, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara Counties. Sec-
tions 24350.3-24350.8 provide for the admission of Napa, Solano, and Sonoma Counties into
the district.
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Constitutionality of a Metropolitan District
Under "Home Rule"-The Most Recent View
The California Supreme Court in its most recent expression of opinion
on the subject of the constitutional validity of a metropolitan agency offers
a clear indication of determination to uphold such an agency when it is
needed to solve a metropolitan problem without any reference to or appar-
ent concern with questions of constitutional "Home Rule." This case-
Santa Barbara etc. Agency v. All Persons--was decided in 1957, and while
the Agency is apparently not a full-blown regulatory body such as the Bay
Area District, and while, therefore, the conclusions of the court with ref-
erence to the Agency may not be considered binding if and when the court
examines the Bay Area District, the opinion does represent evidence of the
view which the court seems likely to take. Questions of constitutionality
under sections 6 and 12 of article XI (which with sections 11 and 13 of that
article constitute the basic "Home Rule" sections) were raised without
success by counsel seeking to defeat the agency, and the opinion hinges to
some degree on a commonalty of treatment of all these sections. However,
for the moment discussion of sections 12 and 13 as well as 11'0 will be post-
poned and section 6 considered first.
Creation by Special Law-Section 6 of Article XI
In some ways the view of section 6 taken by the court is surprising for
it depends in part on a case which the court had overruled in 1946, in part
on a District Court of Appeal decision which the court had previously
ignored, and in part on the doctrine of the "larger municipality" imported
from the court's treatment of sections 12 and 13. Section 6 provides in part:
"Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special
laws; . . . 2" It is reasonably clear that the Bay Area District is a "corpora-
tion"'" and that it was created by special law. The court in Santa Barbara
apparently assumed that the Agency was a "corporation" and it is clear
29 47 Cal. 2d 699, 306 P.2d 875 (1957). The Agency is a county-wide agency covering one
city and four water districts. It was formed under special law to deal with the water shortage
problem in the county. Reversed on other grounds, Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken,
357 U.S. 275 (1958). The case was part of the series which involved the 160 acre limitation on
water use imposed by federal law. It was on this point that the California Supreme Court was
reversed.
30 To be discussed in Part H.
3 1 This conclusion stems from the Madera case, text infra at note 35, in which the court
characterized irrigation districts as public corporations. Certainly special districts as defined
above are a sufficiently separate entity that they cannot be considered as simply a department of
some other organization. So the appellation "corporation" signifying separate legal existence
and status seems proper. But ci., the statement of the court quoted in the text at note 38 and a
subsequent statement in that case that the district was not a corporation at all.
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that it was created by special law. The crucial issue is whether the District
and the Agency are "for municipal purposes," for if they are there would
be a violation of section 6, and it is to this point that the court in Santa
Barbara addresses the opinion. The problem would be less troublesome if
the court had always construed the clause above quoted in conjunction with
the next clause which provides:
... but the legislature shall, by general laws, provide.for the incorporation,
organization, and classification, in proportion to population, of cities and
towns, which may be altered, amended or repealed; .... (Emphasis
supplied.)
The balance of the section deals with cities, their creation and privileges.
It would not be an unreasonable construction to consider the section as a
whole and limit the meaning of "corporation for municipal purposes" to
cities.32 With this restricted meaning, a special district could be created in
any manner so long as it did not qualify as a city, and, it is submitted, a
special district even with regulatory powers would not be likely to qualify.
This is the course chosen by the court in Santa Barbara, but it is a course
at striking variance from the line of decision preceding this case.
Section 6-A Narrow Construction
The above approach was used once by a District Court of Appeal in
1921 in People v. Rinner"8 (cited in Santa Barbara) which was concerned
with the abolition of a school district by special law as one of the reasons
why the special law was not invalid. However, the District Court of Appeal
did not let matters rest there. As an alternative basis for finding that section
6 was not applicable, the court noted that even if it disregarded the "ap-
parently strict limitation," a school district is just not a "corporation for
municipal purposes." 4 Prior to Santa Barbara the Supreme Court had been
content to use this latter approach in upholding a special district challenged
under section 6. Why the court changed tack is uncertain, but some con-
sideration should be given to the approach since it is somewhat inconsistent
with Santa Barbara.
Section 6-A Broad Construction
The court's former method of avoiding section 6 was founded on the
concept of the district as a "state agency" apparently under an assumption
that section 6 applied to the district form, but finding that the particular
3 2 This was the argument used in the Constitutional Convention, supra note 4.
33 52 Cal. App. 747, 199 Pac. 1066 (1921).
34 It is for this latter proposition that the case was subsequently cited until the citation in
Santa Barbara on the former proposition. See, e. g., Butler v. Compton Junior College District,
77 Cal. App. 2d 719, 176 P.2d 417 (1947).
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district was not a "municipal corporation."3 5 Whether the use of this as-
sumption is by design or not is uncertain, but the roots of the assumption
may be found in the opinion of the court in the 1891 decision of In re
Madera Irrigation District" which is the fountainhead of much of the
California law on special districts. The district had been created under a
general law authorizing the formation of irrigation districts, but the con-
tention was made that the statute violated section 6 because it provided for
the creation of municipal corporations contrary to the claimed constitu-
tional scheme. In answering this contention the court stated that the legis-
lature did not have to provide one general plan for creation of all municipal
corporations, but could provide separate plans for each type; that it is not
an unconstitutional delegation to have the community seeking incorpora-
tion indicate assent to the terms of the statute by some act; and that the
municipal corporations that could be so created are not limited to cities and
towns. Thus there was an implication in Madera that section 6 was not
limited to cities and towns and that a special district (or at least an irriga-
tion district) was a municipal corporation. In fact the whole tenor of the
Madera opinion was that the district was a municipal corporation, and in
1897 this concept gave the court trouble.
People v. Reclamation District No. 551,,3 decided that year, was not
concerned with section 6, but it did concern the definition of municipal
corporations. The argument here was that the district was void because the
act under which it had been formed imposed a property qualification on
voters contrary to article II, section 1, and article I, section 24 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. The court was of the opinion that this argument was
sound if the reclamation district was a municipal corporation, and that
Madera had indicated that it was. But the court distinguished between
irrigation districts and reclamation districts. The latter were not for local
self-government, but part of a scheme for conducting a public work and no
one voting for formation was a voter in the constitutional sense. In develop-
ing the public welfare demands which would justify the exercise of the
police power in authorizing irrigation districts, the court in Madera had
emphasized the similarity between irrigation and reclamation districts of
which latter there already existed several examples. This point was simply
ignored by the opinion in People v. No. 551, and the difference between the
35 The term "municipal corporation" does not appear in § 6, and it can be argued that
there is a broader meaning in "corporation for municipal purposes" than in "municipal corpora-
tion." However, the courts take the liberty of substitution of the latter for the former and that
course is followed here in discussing the cases. See text, infra, at p. 123. Another example of
substitution is found in In re Orosi Public Utility District, 196 Cal. 43, 52-53, 235 Pac. 1004,
1008 (1925).
36 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272 (1891).
37 117 Cal. 114, 48 Pac: 1016 (1897).
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two types of districts was declared established. In discussing the problem
of labeling the district the court stated:
If these districts can be said to be corporations at all, I think they are
properly called public corporations for municipal purposes. That phrase
means no more than that they are state organizations for state purposes.38
If we ignore the remarkable substitution of words in these two sentences,
this label is almost the language of section 6. If the court were consistent
in its use of language, this quotation would seem to indicate that even
though not a "municipal corporation" the district would be within section 6.
But the court was not so linguistically consistent when faced with the
problem.
Three years after People v. No. 551 the court was directly faced with
the problem of section 6 and its application to levee districts in People v.
Levee District No. 6.19 In this case the district was claiming that it existed
under an 1891 statute which had been passed to correct deficiencies under a
previous statute and which applied only to District No. 6. The court con-
cluded that the descriptions of districts as:
. . "corporations for municipal purposes," or "public corporations," or
"corporations for public purposes,".. . were convenient phrases of designa-
tion and description, rather than judicial declarations as to the nature of
these agencies. 40
Then People v. No. 551 was cited as conclusively settling the matter
that such districts, while corporations, are not "corporations for municipal
purposes" but are a special breed which the opinion does not choose to
characterize.
Section 6-The State Agency Doctrine
The characterization process developed the next year with Reclamation
District No. 551 v. County of Sacramento4' in which the district was said
to be a part of a scheme of reclamation originating with the state and carried
to conclusion by agents of the state, i.e. the district, which is a public agency.
Therefore, the district was entitled to exemption from county taxation
under article XIII, section 1, taking the exemption of the state although it
was not entitled (due to the previous holding involving this district) to the
exemption granted to municipal corporations.
Local government has the state as the source of its existence and powers,
and in this sense all local government is an agency of the state. However,
3
8 Id. at 120, 48 Pac. at 1017.
39 131 Cal. 30, 63 Pac. 676 (1900).
40 Id. at 33, 63 Pac. at 678.
41134 Cal. 477, 66 Pac. 668 (1901).
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the "state agency" doctrine goes beyond this simple notion of ultimate
source of existence and power. Because the constitution gives "corporations
for municipal purposes" a special status with respect to manner of crea-
tion, and because a special district was thought to be within that category,
when the court wanted to preserve a district which was apparently of con-
siderable value to the growth of the state, the district had to be taken out of
the category and classified as something else. The most handy something
else was the source of power and hence the "state agency." The court in
Madera had stated-and thus started this process along-:
Inasmuch as there is no restriction upon the power of the legislature to
authorize the formation of such corporations for any public purpose what
ever, and as when they are organized they are but mere agencies of the state
in local government, without any powers except such as the legislature may
confer upon them, and are, at all times subject to a revocation of such
power, it was evidently the purpose of the framers of the constitution to
leave in the hands of the legislature full discretion in reference to their
organization .... 42 (Emphasis supplied.)
At this point the court was merely stating the existence and source of power
to create districts, and was not concerned with any labeling process under
section 6. However, the subsequent cases just discussed carried the process
forward.
By the time that People v. Sacramento Drainage District45 was decided
in 1909, there was authority for the creation of a special district by special
law. The court cited the three levee and reclamation district cases and
then stated that these districts were not really corporations at all, but were
governmental agencies for a specific purpose. The state could have done
these things directly, but it generously permitted local participation in the
management through the district device. This case seems to have settled
the matter of section 6 as far as counsel were concerned until the issue came
up in Santa Barbara. Later cases challenging the formation of districts by
special law never mention section 6, 44 but center the attack on another
constitutional restriction on the legislature's power-article IV, section 25,
subdivision 33, which prohibits local or special laws: "In all other cases
where a general law can be made applicable."
42 92 Cal. at 319, 28 Pac. at 278.
43 155 Cal. 373, 103 Pac. 207 (1909). The district was a multi-county district formed to
drain lands in the Sacramento River Valley-a metropolitan district.
44 This is perhaps one very good reason for the failure of the court to use the approach
used by the District Court of Appeal in Rinner in 1921. Between 1921 and 1957 the court had
no opportunity to do so. The problem did not come up directly, but cf. City of Pasadena v.
Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 653, 269 Pac. 630 (1928), and text following note 74.
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Special Districts and Section 2 5 of Article IV-
A Note in Passing
This issue was raised in the Sacramento case but disposed of on the
ground that the considerations demanding a special law were plain and
that a clear showing would have to be made that the law was not required
before the court would interfere with the legislature's determination. How-
ever, this holding did not stop counsel from pressing the argument in sub-
sequent cases-though with no greater success. The most recent case in
this series, Fairfield-Suisun Sewer District v. Hutcheon,4 5 decided by the
District Court of Appeal in 1956, produced the same result as its predeces-
sors.46 Though there was a general law providing for the formation of
districts to provide similar service, the special circumstances were found
sufficient to uphold creation of the particular district by special law follow-
ing the rule laid down in American River Flood Control District v. Sweet.
47
The result was so predictable on this issue that it is surprising that an
appeal was taken.48
The Withdrawal from the ""State Agency" Doctrine
Despite the fact that section 6 was not raised until Santa Barbara in any
direct fashion, there were other developments in the efforts of the court
to deal with the definitional problems raised by the term "municipal corpo-
rations." These cases indicate that the "itate agency" doctrine and the
categorization of the Sacramento Drainage case are somewhat dubious
in application to all districts. Also these cases may suggest a reason for the
adoption of the Rinner construction of section 6 in the Santa Barbara
decision, and may offer some basis for the criticism of that position.
Development Under Section I of Article XIII
In 1914, the constitution was amended in several places, one of which
was article XIII, section 1, and another of which was article XI, section 6
in a matter not of concern in the present article. The amendment of article
XIII, section 1, purported to remove the tax exemption enjoyed by
"municipal corporations" for property owned by them outside their boun-
45 139 Cal. App. 2d 539, 294 P.2d 102 (1956).
46 E.g., Alameda Etc., Water District v. Stanley, 121 Cal. App. 2d 308, 283 P.2d 632 (1953)
and see cases cited therein.
47 214 Cal. 778, 7 P.2d 1030 (1932). The court emphasized the state activity character of
the work to be done by the district in finding a special reason for the special law, which special
reason could not be accomplished under general law according to the court.
48 A possible reason is that this was in essence a bond validation proceeding, and therefore
appellate court approval was sought. This may also suggest a reason why invalidity under § 6
was not and has not been urged until Santa Barbara-it would upset the applecart if successful
in an action which is friendly rather than adverse. In Santa Barbara there were contestants
who were apparently actually opposed to the agency.
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daries. At first blush it might seem strange to equate "municipal cor-
porations" in article XIII, section 1, with "corporations for municipal
purposes" in article XI, section 6,4 but that is exactly what the court did
in Turlock Irrigation District v. White,5" decided in 1921, and cited for this
proposition in Santa Barbara. The case involved an attempt by a county
to tax the district under the amendment to article XIII, claiming that the
district was a municipal corporation and had lost its exemption. The court
held that the county could not tax the district to which the amendment did
not apply. The reason-the irrigation district took the exemption of the
state which was unaffected by the amendment since the district was not a
''municipal corporation" but a "state agency." At this point the case would
seem to be a return to Madera as an abolition of the distinctions drawn in
the cases discussed above, and another application of the "state agency"
doctrine. However, it is the reasoning indulged in by the court in arriving
at this conclusion which makes the case a startling departure.
At the outset, the court was faced with the Madera assumption that the
term "municipal corporations" encompassed more than cities and towns5
and with Merchants Bank v. Escondido Irrigation District52 which had
attempted a broad definition for the purposes of sections 12 and 13 of
article XI.53 To avoid these cases the majority opinion construed the term
as used in the amendment narrowly, applying only the cities, and basing
this construction on the manner in which the amendment had been pre-
sented to the people-as a measure to protect counties against the acquisi-
tion of property by San Francisco and Los Angeles for their water systems
which acquisition, free from taxes, would destroy the counties' tax base.
As further buttress for this construction, the opinion referred to section
6 and stated:
At the same election, article 11, § 6, was amended by the people. This
section restricts the power of the legislature in the formation of municipal
corporations, to providing by general law for their formation, and prohibits
the formation of such corporations by special statute. That section uses the
term "municipal corporations" as synonymous with "cities and towns."''
Since only cities and towns could be "municipal corporations" and since an
irrigation district was not a city or town, an irrigation district could not be a
"municipal corporation." It was this reasoning and this quotation which the
49 See supra, note 35.
50 186 Cal. 183, 198 Pac. 1060 (1921).
51 See text, supra at notes 35-37.
52 144 Cal. 329, 77 Pac. 937 (1904). The court held unconstitutional a statutory provision
permitting irrigation districts to pledge or mortgage their property.
53 To be discussed in Part II.
54 186 Cal. at 188, 198 Pac. at 1062.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11M2
court in Santa Barbara used to conclude that section 6 is limited to cities
and towns of which the Agency was not an example.5 5 So dicta, and some-
what gratuitous dicta at that, becomes authority." However, there is an
even greater objection to the use of Turlock as authority-it was spe-
cifically overruled in 1946 by Rock Creek Water District v. County of
Calaveras.5 7 Nothing was said about Rock Creek in The Santa Barbara
opinion which leaves the matter open for speculation. Did the court intend
to overrule Rock Creek or was it an error with respect to Turlock's status
as authority?58
Before examining the Rock Creek case, it is necessary to consider the de-
velopments which preceded that case. The first case in this series, Henskaw
v. Foster,59 decided in 1917 (before Turlock); concerned the formation of
the San Diego Municipal Water District.6 0 The District was challenged on
the ground that no hearing had been given to property owners before the
election for formation was called.61 In answering this challenge (raised by
an action to enjoin the calling of the election), the court characterized the
District as a public corporation with political duties and distinguished it
from a district where the benefits were to be assessed against the land. In
support of this position the court cited and quoted from Madera. It is
interesting to note that the court had already termed the District a
"municipality" for purposes of sections 12 and 13 of article XI.62
In Turlock the opinion embraced the "state agency" doctrine as noted
before. The opinion did not stop with the reasoning previously discussed,
but went on to explain that the exemption that irrigation districts had been
enjoying was not founded on the "municipal corporation" provision, but
on the state's exemption provision, citing No. 551 v. County of Sacramento
55 47 Cal. 2d at 710, 306 P.2d at 882.
56 There was no reason for the opinion to consider § 6, and it did not bother to use the
actual § 6 terminology. Rinner was not cited, but since it was decided the same year, the court
may have been aware of the construction used there. The opinion in Turlock makes no mention
of the assumption in a situation where the point need not have been brought up.
57 29 Cal. 2d 7, 172 P.2d 863 (1946).
58 The briefs of the parties cite and discuss Rock Creek and its possible effect on Turlock so
the court must have been aware of the situation. Opening Brief for Appellant, p. 30; Brief for
Respondent, pp. 33-34; Closing Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5 and 17. Respondent's brief con-
tended that Rock Creek did not overrule Turlock on the matter of § 6, only on the matter of
article XIII, § 1. The trouble with this position is that § 6 was not at issue in Turlock, but the
references to that section were merely dicta. Further, the court dearly rejected a narrow con-
struction of "municipal corporations" in Rock Creek, approving the dissenting opinion in
Turlock. This last was pointed out in the appellant's closing brief.
59 176 Cal. 507, 169 Pac. 82 (1917).
60 The district is properly described as metropolitan, covering three incorporated cities and
one irrigation district. Id. at 508, 169 Pac. at 83.
61 See text, supra at notes 15-17.
6-2To be discussed in Part II.
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which had made a similar determination with reference to reclamation
districts." Then the opinion equated irrigation districts with reclamation
districts (d la Madera) and concluded that the district was a "state
agency" quoting from Madera to the effect that the property of the district
(which had just been labelled state property) was subject to state control.
Ml this despite the apparent denial of the assumption underlying Madera-
that irrigation districts are "municipal corporations."
The year after Turlock (1922) the Henshaw decision was to haunt the
court when it considered the formation of a new Madera Irrigation District
in Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors." An election had been
called by the Board of Supervisors and suit was brought by a property
owner to test that call, claiming that it had not received an adequate hear-
ing. In holding that the district was of the type of which a hearing must be
given, the court distinguished Henshaw on the ground that the Municipal
Water District was something greater governmentally than an irrigation
district. Thus whatever might be said concerning the necessity for hearing
preceding the formation of such a district, it did not apply to an irrigation
district, which was of the benefit-burden type. Madera was disposed of on
the ground that it had been decided prior to the federal constitution deci-
sion in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley 5 which set forth the benefit-
burden hearing requirement, and so Madera must be disregarded.
From Madera to Turlock an irrigation district was a "municipal cor-
poration," and from Madera to Miller & Lux it could be created as a
"'municipal corporation"-without hearing as to the inclusion of property
within its boundaries. After these cases (at least until Rock Creek and
possibly after Santa Barbara) an irrigation district was a "state agency"-
assessment district.6 But from Henshaw and inferentially from Miller &
Lux there was a type of district which could be created as a "municipal
corporation."
The "Quasi-Municipal Corporation"
In 1925 the terminology of the Henshaw type of district became more
concrete. The In re Orosi Public Utility District" opinion of that year
called the district a "quasi-municipal corporation." Again the district was
3 See text, supra at note 41.
64 189 Cal. 254, 208 Pac. 304 (1922).
65 176 Cal. 507, 169 Pac. 82 (1917).
66 One interesting consequence of the "state agency" doctrine is that the officers of the dis-
trict and persons submitting false claims can be prosecuted under a statute making it a crime
to submit false claims to state officers. People v. Richards, 86 Cal. App. 86, 260 Pac. 582 (1926)
(flood control district). This must have been somewhat of a shock to the defendant, who could
not have been convicted otherwise.
67 196 Cal. 43, 235 Pac. 1004 (1925).
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formed without a hearing, and the action was brought to test the validity
of its formation so that bonds could be sold. Again there was discussion of
the distinction between this type of district and the "assessment" districts
which are not "municipal corporations." The court noted that under article
XI, section 19, "any municipal corporation may establish . . . public
works .. ." for supplying utilities to their inhabitants; that the legislature
sought to give the same power to unincorporated areas; and that the legis-
lature can give such governmental powers as it desires (relying on the
Madera opinion three years after Miller & Lux!), stating:
"The creation of municipal corporation does not have for its sole object
the formation of political subdivisions of the state for governmental pur-
poses, but there is also the association of the members of the particular com-
munity for the administration of their local business and affairs in matters
largely outside of the sphere of government as such."
68
The court then held that this district was a "quasi-municipal corporation."
The language just quoted and the analogies to city organization and gov-
ernment used by the court to indicate that such a district is to be treated
like a municipal corporation. Of course, this case and Henshaw were con-
cerned with the hearing problem under the federal constitution, but the
indicia of similarities and the tests used for this purpose do provide clues
to the characterization for other purposes. The court in Santa Barbara did
not consider these cases nor the implications they raise. The Agency was
not a city, and apparently any similarity to a city was immaterial.
The characterization process continued in City of Pasadena v. Cham-
berlain,9 decided in 1928, which labelled the Metropolitan Water District
in the Los Angeles area as a "quasi-municipal corporation." The District
was being organized to supply water to the cities in the area, and this was
an action to compel the Pasadena City Clerk to certify the passage of an
ordinance which was one of the steps in formation under the statute. Here
too the labelling was done to meet the hearing problem. However, the
problem was more complicated because this district (like the district in
Henshaw) was a metropolitan district-it spanned several cities. It was
contended that the statute was invalid because it interferred with the right
of charter cities to make all laws and regulations with respect to their
municipal affairs as guaranteed by section 6 (in a portion of that section
which appears after the special law restriction). In answering this conten-
tion the court concluded that supplying water to all these cities was not
an interference in a "municipal affair," and was, therefore, something the
legislature could deal with without violating section 6.71 So the district was
W Id. at 57, 235 Pac. at 1010.
69 204 Cal. 653, 269 Pac. 630 (1928).
7 0 Id. at 659-60, 269 Pac. at 633.
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declared to be a "quasi-municipal corporation" not dealing with "municipal
affairs." It is for this purpose that the Pasadena case is cited and quoted
from in Santa BarbaraJ According to the court in Santa Barbara if there
is no "municipal affair," i.e. no activity solely within the province of a city,
there is no "municipal purpose" involved in the activities of the Agency
and hence no violation of section 6. It is submitted, however, that this is a
switch on the "larger municipality" doctrine which was also involved in
the Pasadena case.
The Larger Municipality Doctrine
Actually the "larger municipality" doctrine arose under sections 12
and 13 of article XI rather than under section 6, and therefore the bulk of
the discussion of the doctrine will be postponed until these sections are
taken up.72 The "larger municipality" doctrine is founded on the concept
that when a physical problem goes beyond the boundaries of established
municipalities (becomes metropolitan), its solution ceases to be a function
or purpose of the established governments, but becomes the concern of the
"larger municipality." It seems implicit in this doctrine that even though
the solution is not a "municipal function" or "purpose" of the established
governments, it is a "municipal function" or "purpose" of the "larger
municipality." This implication may have been in the mind of the court in
Pasadena since the "larger municipality" doctrine was applied to the issues
under sections 12 and 13, but a different approach was used with respect
to section 6. As far as the "municipal affairs" problem of section 6 was
concerned the court stated that there was no interference with the cities
since there was no attempt to supply water directly to the populace. Rather
the water was to be supplied to the cities which would distribute it, and
hence no interference with the cities' rightsY.7  This is not the "larger
municipality" doctrine and does not suggest that the "larger municipality"
has no "municipal purposes." However, Santa Barbara appears to conclude
that the two concepts are related and there can be no violation of section 6
if a "larger municipality" can be found.
Early in the opinion in Pasadena the court disposed of a contention
that the statute was a special law because it did not authorize the formation
of districts in unincorporated areas. The law could apply wherever the con-
ditions required its use and thus was general.74 The reason for declaring the
7147 Cal. 2d at 710, 306 P.2d at 882.
72 To be discussed in Part II.
73 City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 653, 659-60, 269 Pac. 630, 633 (1928).
7 4 Id. at 658-659, 269 Pac. at 632. The statute is a good example of a general law which
can apply to only one situation.
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statute to be a general law appeared later in the opinion when the court
in discussing the hearing problem stated:
• . . we can perceive no real distinction between the organization of a
municipal corporation, strictly so called, for the carrying forth of the pur-
poses usually committed to such governmental agencies and the organiza-
tion under legislative sanction of such other governmental agencies as
municipal water districts or public utility districts or metropolitan water
districts, which, while these may not exercise all of the functions committed
to municipal corporations, strictly so called, are empowered to exercise
certain of these functions as at least quasi-governmental in character.
75
If a quasi-municipal corporation is no different than a full-fledged "muni-
cipal corporation" and can exercise some of the "municipal functions," then
it has "municipal purposes" and cannot be created by special law. So the
court had to dispose of the general or special nature of the statute and did
so in favor of the district. This point is completely ignored in Santa Barbara
despite the citation of Pasadena. Certainly there is a logical inconsistency
here.
Collision of the "State Agency" and
eeQuasi-Municipal Corporation" Doctrines
The "state agency" doctrine was rolling along side by side with the
"quasi-municipal corporation" doctrine, and the two collided head on in
1930 in Morrison v. Smith Bros., Inc.76 The issue was the liability in tort
of the East Bay Municipal Utility District (a metropolitan district organ-
ized to supply water to cities in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties).
There was an 1898 case which had decided that since a reclamation district
was a "state agency," it was not liable for its torts. When some workmen
working on a project for the East Bay Utility District were injured, the
District sought to escape liability on the ground that it too was a "state
agency." The attempt was unsuccessful for the District was a "quasi:
municipal corporation;" the governmental-proprietary distinction applied
as it did to municipal corporations; and this was a proprietary activity. 7
This case offers further evidence that at least until Santa Barbara
"municipal corporations" encompassed more than cities and towns.
The trend of distinction was preserved by Metropolitan Water District
v. County of Riverside,79 decided in 1943, which held that that district was
subject to taxation on property owned outside its boundaries under the
75 Id. at 663, 269 Pac. at 634.
76 211 Cal. 36, 293 Pac. 53 (1930).
7 7 Hensley v. Reclamation District No. 556, 121 Cal. 96, 53 Pac. 401 (1898).
78 The distinction for this tort purpose is probably no longer valid, for it has been held
that the state is liable for its proprietary activities. People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754,
178 P.2d 1 (1947). This would obviate any necessity to decide whether the district is a "state" or
"municipal" agency.
79 21 Cal. 2d 640, 134 P.2d 249 (1943).
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1914 amendment to article XIII, section 1, discussed above. The court
reasoned that it would be anomalous not to apply the amendment to the
district which was accomplishing the purposes, the taxation of which the
amendment was passed to cover. The District was still labelled "quasi,"
'but it was so close that the court stated that its purposes were municipal-
the language of section 6. This District was the same one involved in
Pasadena and its purposes are "municipal," but this case was not considered
in Santa Barbara, though it is inconsistent with the result reached there.
The court had carefully distinguished Turlock in the County of River-
side case, but the distinction between "state agency" and "quasi-municipal
'corporation" lasted only three more years, at least as far as irrigation and
county water districts were concerned under article XIII, section 1. As has
been noted before, the court overruled Turlock in the Rock Creek case
8 0
which involved another attempt by a county to tax districts. First the court
in Rock Creek discussed the narrow construction given "municipal cor-
porations" in Turlock and concluded that that construction was wrong,
quoting from the dissenting opinion in Turlock as setting forth the best
reasoning for the broad construction."' Next came the second ground on
Turlock-"state agency"-and here the court indulged in an interesting
process of reasoning. The County of Riverside case had said that municipal
water districts were within article XIII, section 1 and the court could see
no valid distinction between such districts and irrigation and water districts
(despite the distinction enunciated in County of Riverside which the
court did not mention), and so County of Riverside was authority
for overruling Turlock. 2 At no point in the opinion is the "state agency"
doctrine discussed, but the result of the case was that the District was
no longer entitled to the state's exemption,83 which leads to the conclusion
that that doctrine is also overruled, since the case which announced it was
so specifically overruled.
80 Supra notes 57-58.
81 Id. at 10-11, 172 P.2d at 865-66.
82 See text, supra at note 63.
83 The irrigation districts did not take the case lying down. The legislature was prevailed
upon to change the statute fixing the boundaries of such districts to permit them to include non-
contiguous district owned property within their boundaries, thus getting back under the pro-
tection of the exemption. CAL. WATER ConE §§ 26901 and 29566.1 were amended by Stats.
1947 c. 725 (p. 1776) and c. 749 (p. 1803) to permit the districts to petition for the inclusion of
non-contiguous property under § 26875. The court upheld these amendments, though it rejected
plea of counsel for the Irrigation Districts Association to overturn Rock Creek. County of Mari-
posa v. Merced Irrigation District, 32 Cal. 2d 467, 196 P.2d 920 (1948). Counsel contended that
there was a long line of decision which used the "state agency" doctrine in other questions con-
cerning the activities of irrigation districts which had not been considered by the court in Rock
Creek. Amicus Curiae Brief of Irrigation Districts Association, Sac. Nos. 5914, 1915, 1916,
pp. 24-41. The court dismissed these contentions. 32 Cal. 2d at 477, 196 P.2d at 926. One might
conclude that these cases are overruled.
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It should be noted that the Santa Barbara opinion did not turn the
construction of section 6 on the "state agency" doctrine. Rather, the court
there chose to rest its position on the first ground of Turlock-a restricted
construction of section 6. While this ground was also disapproved in Rock
Creek, Santa Barbara may mean that Rock Creek is overruled on the
narrow or broad construction issue, but stands with respect to the elimina-
tion of the "state agency" doctrine. On the other hand, it can be argued
that Santa Barbara was simply wrongly decided in light of Rock Creek and
its predecessors and that Rock Creek still stands for both propositions.
The court in Rock Creek was careful to limit its interpretation to article
XIII, section 1, when it said:
Whether irrigation or water districts such as we have here are municipal
corporations in connection with tort liability and other questions is unim-
portant.8
4
This may suggest that Rock Creek has no effect on section 6, but Turlock,
while concerned with article XIII, section 1, used reasoning based in part
on section 6, and Santa Barbara used the overruled article XIII reasoning 5
as well as doctrines developed under sections 12 and 13 of article XI in
determining the construction of section 6. If it can be said that this broader
method is proper, then Rock Creek and the line of cases from Henshaw to
County of Riverside indicate that Santa Barbara is a striking departure
from the court's previous views, if not an erroneous departure.
The Bay Area District Under These Decisions
With respect to the Bay Area District it might be argued that the
Santa Barbara case is restricted to agencies concerned with the water
problem, an argument which receives support from the opinion. 6 However,
if the decision is followed literally with respect to its construction of section
6, then the Bay Area District has little to fear from that section since it is
not a "city." If this is true, one may well ask what has happened to "Home
Rule." If section 6 is only concerned with the creation of cities by special
law, why could the legislature not create a multi-function district with
regulatory powers and solve the metropolitan problem by eliminating the
cause-independence of local government? Perhaps a multi-function dis-
trict would be classified as a city because it does so many things, but the
present writer fails to see any qualitative difference between such a district
and the Bay Area District.
84 29 Cal. 2d at 12, 172 P.2d at 866.
85 A District Court of Appeal in Laguna Beach County Water District v. County of Orange,
30 Cal. App. 2d 740, 87 P.2d 46 (1939) (specifically overruled in Rock Creek and cited as author-
ity in Santa Barbara) founded a portion of its reasoning on the proposition that these districts
could be created by special law, not being within § 6 (based on Twrlock, a la Santa Barbara).
The issue raised in the case concerned article XIII, § 1, and the § 6 reasoning was used to show
that the district was not a "municipal" corporation.
80 47 Cal. 2d at 710, 306 P.2d at 882.
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